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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions of the State of 
Utah; and 






STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for a judicial review of the actions 
and proceedings of the defendant Commissioner of 
F'inancial Institutions in authorizing the Bank of Nor-
thern Utah to operate a bank in Clearfield, Utah, pur-
to the order of said Commissioner, dated March 
12, 1969. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of de-
fendants and against plaintiff, of no cause of action. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the lower 
court decision, and a determination that the def enaant 
Commissioner's action in authorizing the Bank of North-
0rn Utah to operate a bank in Clearfield, Utah, was 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and other-
wise not in accordance with law; and for a judgment an<l 
order vacating and holding invalid the order of said 
Commissioner wherein such authorization was granted, 
enjoining defendant Bank of Northern from establishing 
its bank at Clearfield, and awarding damages to plain-
tiff-appellant in event the Bank of Northern Utah en-
gages in the banking business. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about September 17, 1968, the defendant, Bank 
of Northern Utah, an unincorporated association, filed 
its application with the defendant Commissioner to op-
erate a bank in Clearfield, Utah. After due notice of the 
filing of such application was given, protests to the 
granting of such application were filed by six banking 
institutions, :including plaintiff-appellant, and the State 
Savings and Loan Association. Plaintiff operates a bank 
at Clearfield, Utah. A public hearing was held on N ovem-
ber 26-29, 1968, and concluded on December 6, 1968. The 
defendant Commissioner issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions, and Order on March 12, 1969. (R. 6-10) The 
plaintiff-appellant prosecuted its review of that order, 
(R. 1-5) and defendants filed their answers to the com-
plaint. (R. 14-17; R. 21-22). Determination was made 
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by tlw lower court following hearing thereon, the court 
issniHg- J memorandum decision (R. 24-34) and its judg-
(R. ;);), 36) Appeal has been taken from the memo-
randum decision and the judgment (R. 37) 
In this brief the transcript of testimony of the ad-
ministratiYe hearing is referred to by the abbreviation, 
"Tr.", and the exhibits, as marked in the hearing. In 
the hearing the plaintiff-appellant was referred to as 
the "protestant Clearfield State Bank" and the defen-
dant Bank of Northern Utah by the designation "ap-
plicant". The parties are referred to herein by 
terms as well as by the designations in the lower court. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPOSED BANKING FACILITY 
IS IN FACT A BRANCH BANK AND ANY 
THEREOF C 0 NT RA-
VENES STATE LAW. 
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, precludes 
the establishment of a branch bank in Clearfield, Utah, 
hy a state bank, inasmuch as that municipality is not 
a city of the first class, and the Clearfield State Bank 
1s located at Clearfield. The statute provides, in part: 
''Except in cities of the first class, or within 
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city 
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
be established in any city or town in which is lo-
cated a hank or banks, state or national, regularly 
transacting a customary banking business, unless 
the bank seeking to establish such branch shall 
take oYer an existing branch. " " " " 
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It is submitted that the proposed institution is in 
fact a branch of the Bank of Utah, and that defendant 
applicant has attempted by a subterfuge to circumvent 
the provisions of the statute aforementioned. 
The evidence at the administrative hearing in<licatf's 
that the Bank of Utah has its principal office at Ogden, 
Utah, and maintains branches at South Ogden, River-
dale, and Roy, Utah, all within a few miles and travel 
minutes from Clearfield. (Tr. 280-282; Plaintiff protest-
ant's Exhibit C) It is also apparent that the controlling 
stock ownership of the Bank of Utah and the proposed 
controlling stock ownership of the applicant are one and 
the same; that is, those incorporators whose stock owner-
ship will control the defendant Bank of Northern Utah 
are also the controlling stockholders of the Bank of Utah. 
(Tr. 462, 159-160) 
According to 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 
pages 240-241 : 
"Where the corporate form of organization 
is adopted or a corporate entity is asserted in an 
endeavor to evade a statute as to modify its in-
tent, courts will disregard the corporation or its 
entity and look at the substance and reality of 
the matter." 
That a "branch" bank arises where there is common 
ownership of two banking corporations is apparent from 
the case of Braeburn Securities Corporation v. Smdh, 
153 N.E. 2d 806, wherein the Illinois Supreme Court ex-
plained a rationale of the bank holding company act of 
that state as follows: 
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" " " " Branch banking in Illinois has been 
prohibited for many years. 
"It is clear that this prohibition could be 
1·. !'('nm vented and indirect branch hanking re-
sult if, through ownership of bank stock, one or 
more bank holding companies could control sev-
eral banks. Branch banking can be accomplished 
by one bank operating at several locations or by 
one company owning or controlling several banks 
variously located." at 809, 810. 
According to the 1967 supplement to 1 1\Iichie, Banks 
and Banking, Section 27: 
''The corporate wil should be pierced when-
ever one bank is doing business through the in-
strumentality of another or in the same way as 
if the institutions were one and, if such circum-
stances exist, the relationship of parent and 
branch exists within federal and state statutes 
prohibiting branch banks even though banks are 
separate corporate organizations." 
See Whituey National Bank in Jefferson Parrish 
1'. Bank of Nrw Orleans and Trust Company, 323 F. 
2d 290. (rev. on other grounds 379 U.S., 411) 
In addition to the common control of the defendant 
Bank of Northern Utah, and the Bank of Utah, a unitary 
type and plan of operation is indicated from the fol-
lowing: 
(a) 'fhe office of cashier of the Bank of Utah and 
the office of cashier of the Bank of Northern Utah, are 
to he held by the same person, William Beutler. (Tr. 
1.i5, !l4, 72) According to 10 American Jurisprudence 
2d, Banks, p. 132: 
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''The bank cashier generally has greater in-
herent power than any other bank officer. Or-
dinarily, the cashier of a hank is regarded as 
its chief executive officer ... '' 
It is stated in 4 Michie, Banks and Banking, pages 9fi 
and 97 as follows : 
''The powers and duties of a cashier, in vir-
tue of his office, are much greater than the presi-
dent's though his office is strictly executive. In 
fact, the cashier generally has greater inherent 
powers than any other bank officer. " " " '' 
(see cases cited in the treatise, and the curreut 
supplement thereto.) 
It is certain that the Bank of Utah and the Bank 
of Northern Utah, managed by a common cashier, will 
engage in a singular operation. Although one might 
initially wonder how l\Ir. Beutler can truly represent 
the interests of two banking institutions whose respec-
tive fields of seeming competition overlap, there is noth-
ing really anomolous with his role when the corporate 
veil is pierced, for it is then apparent that the two in-
stitutions are doing business in the same way as if they 
were one, and/or that the applicant is the instrumen-
tality of the Bank of Utah. 
(b) There are interlocking officers and directors of 
the Bank of Northern Utah and Bank of Utah (Tr. 155, 
156) indicative of the plan of operation, and the new 
institution will be managed and controlled by the execu-
tives of the Bank of Utah. 
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( c) Bank of Utah will in effect subsidize the 
J),": k of N" ort hem U taL. The cashier of the Bank of 
;\or11H'rn Utah, "William Beutler, will receive no salary 
as cm;hier, hut will continue as a salaried employee and 
cashier of the Bank of Utah. (Tr. 95, 96) Yet he will 
devote whatever time is required to the Bank of North-
ern Utah, " " " " whether it was half a day, an hour a 
day, or eight hours a day." (Emphasis added) (Tr. 96) 
This unitary accomodation between the two banking in-
stitutions was explained by 1\fr. Beutler as follows: 
'' Q. How can you function as a cashier of the 
Bank of Northern Utah without leaving the 
Bank of Utah? 
A. If I can liken this to a situation between the 
Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond, 
"Which yon have been rather interested in, you 
know we ha\'e a new officer, an auditor. We 
allow our auditor at the Bank of Utah to spend 
certain time at the Bank of Ben Lomond for 
which the Bank of Utah is compensated. Thus 
this one officer ends up as an officer of each 
bank. So we would expect a similar situation. 
However, with this exception, we would not as 
organizers of a new bank want to put undue 
drain on the resources of our new child here, 
our new bank. So I for one, and I can speak 
only for myself, would be willing to serve the 
new bank without compensation and I fully 
plan to." (Tr. 95) 
(d) The architecture of the proposed Bank of 
Xorth<>rn Utah reflects the architecture used by the Bank 
of Utah. The application indicates it will be "colonial 
sty!Pd ". Frank Browning responded to a question 
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regarding the proposed architecture of the Bank of 
Northern Utah, when authorized heretofore, as followR · 
'' Q. Mr. Browning, let me ask this, do you recall 
ever making a statement that the architecture 
of the new bank and the interior design would 
follow the colonial architecture exemplified 
in Ogden and all branch banks of the Bank of 
Utah? 
A. I am sure I made that statement. If a reporter 
asked me that, that is the statement I would 
make." (Tr. 266) 
Plaintiff protestant 's Exhibit AB represents the 
architect's sketch of the proposed building of the appli-
cant. (Tr. 443) Plaintiff protestant's Exhibits AC and 
AD are photographs of the Bank of Utah's branch at 
Riverdale, Utah, within five miles of Clearfield. An ex-
amination of said Exhibits AB, AC, and AD reveals 
that the proposed building of the applicant is virtually 
identical with the Riverdale branch of the Bank of Utah, 
further suggesting a solitary plan of operation. 
( e) The application has been referred to as that of 
a branch. Under cross examination Mr. Beutler was 
asked if the Bank of Utah were to apply for a branch 
at Syracuse, Utah, would it weigh the resulting impact 
on the Bank of Northern Utah. The question and answer 
follow: 
"Q. Do you think that they would, in their con-
sideration weigh the impact of that branch 
on the Bank of Northern Utah? 
A. Well, I don't know. They probably would. We 
would consider it in much the same way we 
8 
tried to consider the impact on the other North 
Davis banks in applying for this branch." 
(Emphasis added) (Tr. 108) 
(f) The defendant, Bank of Northern Utah, by its 
application in the instant matter and in its previous ap-
plications has designated a business name which suggests 
a similarity to Bank of Utah. Initially the proposed name 
of the corporation was to be Central Bank of Utah (Tr. 
468-±G9), but for a reason immaterial here, the proposed 
name was changed to Bank of Northern Utah. In either 
caRl', hy emphasis or de-emphasis, the phrases, Central 
Hank of Utah, and Bank of Northern Utah, contain the 
1rnnls necessary to indicate identification of the de-
fr11dnnt applicant with the Bank of Utah. 
(g) The projected operating income as set forth in 
thr application was based upon the performance rate of 
the Bank of Utah; it was opined that the projected op-
Prating expenses in the Bank of Northern Utah would 
fall somewhere within the same category as those of the 
Bank of Utah. (Tr. 89, 90, 99) 
En•n though the applicant is a proposed corpora-
tion, claiming status as a distinct entity, its existence 
and apart from the Bank of Utah cannot be 
sustained. In this matter the corporate veil should be 
piercrd, and the resulting exposure indicates that the 
Bank of Utah and the proposed Bank of Northern Utah 
will operate as if the two institutions were one, and/or 
the latter as the instrumentality of the former, in con-
trnw·11tio11 of Utah law. 
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According to Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amend-
ed, a ground for refusal of approval of an application 
for a banking charter is " * * " when the plan of opera-
tion does not comply with the laws of the state governing 
such institution * " * '' . In this case it is submitted that 
the proposed operation violates the provisions of Section 
7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, as heretofore set forth. 
It is further submitted that the failure of the Commis-
of Financial Institutions to so find, and his fur-
ther failure to pierce the corporate veil, and go behind 
the application and proposed articles, was arbitrary and 
capnc10us. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS IN PRECLUDING PLAIN-
TIFF'S ELICITING PROBATIVE EVI-
DENCE, AND IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE 
AND INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT 
MADE AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
As has been set forth in a prior point, plaintiff con-
tends that the proposed banking institution is in fact a 
branch of the Bank of Utah, and its 0stablishment i11 
Clearfield, Utah, would violate Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended. At the hearing on this matter, plain-
tiff, in attempting to elicit evidence on the issue of 
whether the proposed operation constituted branch bank-
ing, was precluded from producing such evidence; ancl 
during the course of the hearing defendant applicant 
tendered "confidential" information on that subject to 
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thC' ( of Fin an c i a 1 Institutions, which 
1w.ther of the defendants made available to the plaintiff. 
It is elementary that due process requirements of 
tlH· federal and state constitutions require that a hear-
ing before an administrative agency exercising judicial, 
qnasi judicial, or adjudicatory powers must be fair, open, 
and impartial, and if such a hearing is denied, the ad-
ministrative action is void. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative 
Law, p. 222. It is also fundamental that an administrative 
body may not base a decision, or findings in support 
thereof, upon evidence or information, outside the record, 
and in particular upon evidence obtained without the 
presence of and notice to interested parties, and not 
made known to them prior to the decision. Annotation, 
18 A.L.R. 2d 552. A rule otherwise would amount to a 
denial of a hearing. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 
407; E11glish z:. Long Beach, (Calif.) 217 P.2d 22. See 
also Spencer r. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 
P.2d 618; Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service 
('0111m. et al., 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542. 
1 Davis, AclministratiYe Law Treatise, p. 412, states: 
"The true principle is that a party who has 
a sufficient interest or right at stake in a deter-
mination of governmental action should be en-
titled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with 
the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examina-
tion, and argument, unfavorable evidence of ad-
judicative facts, except in the rare circumstance 
when some other interest, such as national sec-
urity, justifies an overriding of the interest in 
fair hearing. " " " '' 
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During plaintiff's examination of William W. Beut-
ler, Vice President and Cashier of the Bank of Utah, a11<l 
cashier and director of the Bank of Northern Utah, the 
witness was asked the identity of the stockholders 
had controlling interest of the Bank of Utah and Bank 
of Ben Lomond. (Tr. 69-72) (Tr. 71, 72) The evidence 
sought was to "establish that the control of the Bank of 
Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond is also the controlling 
interest of the applicant bank". (Tr. 70) The witness in-
dicated the information was available. The plaintiff re-
quested of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions 
" " " " An order directing Jfr. Beutler to 
furnish at this hearing the stockholders of the 
Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomond, or 
in the alternative the stockholders of the Bank 
of Utah who own 89% of the stock of the Bank 
of Utah who also own 73.55% of the stock of Ben 
Lomond'', 
of which ownership percentages the witness had pre-
viously given testimony. (Tr. 74, 69) 
The Commissioner of Financial Institutions <lenier1 
the request for the order sought, concluding it was con-
fidential information. He invited the clefc,nclant Bank of 
Northern Utah 
" " " " to consider informing us whether any 
of the applicants in this matter or any combina-
tion of individual applicants represent a control-
ling interest in any other hank. I will leave it np 
to them whether they furnish the information or 
not but I will open the hearing for that infornrn-
tion if they care to furnish it." (Tr. 84, 8G) 
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The plaintiff restated that the purpose of its in-
tpti r.1· \\'as to establish that the defendant applicant was 
,, hrn:1d1 of the Bank of Utah and/or Bank of Ben 
Lomond, and that the evidence sought also bore upon the 
question of competition and monopoly inasmuch as the 
Bank of Utah ha(l branches at South Ogden, Riverdale, 
a]l(l Roy, all close mileage of Clearfield State 
Bank. (Tr. 86) Plaintiff requested an order requiring 
the procludion of the percentage of stock ownership that 
caeh incorporator of the applicant owns of the stock of 
the Bank of Utah and/or the Bank of Ben Lomond, and 
also the percentage of stock that such incorporator owns 
in any corporation which owns stock in the Bank of Utah 
or Bank of Ben Lomond. (Tr. 87) The Commissioner 
<k11iPd the request, indicating the submission of the in-
formation to be voluntary. 
'' * • • I am going to not issue a formal order 
that your furnish this information * * • the hear-
ing will accept this information and testimony 
on it if you care to bring it." (Tr. 88) 
8uhsequently, during the hearing, voluntary sub-
mission of the percentages of stock ow'llership was given 
to the Commissioner of Financial Institutions by defen-
tla n t applicant 
" • • • on the condition it was given to the 
Commissioner as a confidential matter • • • " 
(Tr.156) 
H was not madP arnilahle to the plaintiff protestant (Tr. 
l:i7), and objection to not being afforded the oppor-
to examine the materials submitted was raised. 
( '!' r . .J.61--tG2) 
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It is not only apparent from the transcript of the 
hearing that evidence was tendered by the defendant 
applicant and received by the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions relating to the stock interests af oremention-
ed, and plaintiff was not allowed the opportunity to 
examine the same, but the transcript of oral argument 
in the trial court contains the admissions of counsel for 
the Bank of Northern Utah that certain of the evidence 
and information thus submitted to the Commissioner was 
not made available to the counsel for the plaintiff pro-
testant. (R. 97, 98; Oral Argument Transcript, Trial 
Court) 
In conclusion 5 of the defendant Commissioner'R 
order he ''concludes'' of the organizers of the proposed 
bank: 
'' * * * Their financial responsibility is es-
tablished by personal financial statements that 
have been filed with the Commissioner." (R. 9) 
The record of the hearing indicates no such filing. 
The plaintiff submits that the "conclusion" aforemen-
toined was unsupported by any evidence-or if such eYi-
dence were submitted by the defendant Bank of Northern 
Utah, then the receipt thereof by the Commissioner, and 
not making the same available to plaintiff, is action of 
an arbitrary and capricious nature. 
It would seem that the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions would be interested in determining the inter-
relationship of the banking institutions aforementioned, 
and whether the defendant applicant was or was not 
14 
·'''JHHate (•ntity in fact, and whether there would be a 
L·"·'-'L·ning of competition in the area by reason of the 
ii.t, rrelationships enumerated. It is submitted that the 
('ommif"sioner should have ordered the production of 
rYirlrnce regarding the relationships at issue here, and 
his failure to do so, was arbitrary and capricious. 
Although recignizing the law anent branch banking, 
the Commissioner in his decision dismissed the issue here 
pn·sented with the conclusion: '' 4. That applicant's re-
quest is to establish a unit bank, not a branch bank." 
( R. 9). This cursory dismissal and the failure of the 
Commissioner to pursue his own inquiry of the relation-
ship of the defendant applicant and the Bank of North-
rm Utah invokes the language of Central and Southern 
Jf()for Freight Tariff Association, et al v. U.S. et al, 273 
F.Rupp.823,at832: 
" " " " What is disturbing is the mechanistic, 
metaphysical incantation of the doctional bar of 
th(l corporate veil. Such doctrines lose much of 
their sacrosanctity when urged in the context of 
regulated industries. The fact that a subsidiary 
corporation exists should be a starting point for 
a searching inquiry, not the finish line. " " " " 
In all the aforementioned was the defendant Com-
miRsioner arbitrary and caprieious; in precluding plain-
tiff in the elicitation of probative evidence; in denying 
the requests of plaintiff for orders compelling the pro-
1lnetion of prohati,·e evidence; and in the "unilateral" 
reeeption of evidence submitted by defendant applicant 
whieh was not made available to the plaintiff. Had the 
P\'i<l<>rn'r heen made available to plaintiff, further in-
15 
<1niry could have been pursued, and evidence produced, 
regarding the question of branch banking, and the ri1ws. 
tion of competition and monopoly. The action of the de-
fendant Commissioner was prejudicial to plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT APPLICANT DOES 
NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE CAPITAL 
AND SURPLUS. 
Section 7-3-10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, sets forth 
the minimum capital and surplus required to engage in 
the banking business, of which at least fifty per cent of 
the said capital and surplus must be paid in cash. See 
Section 7-3-11, U.C.A. 1953. 
The applicants represented under oath in an affi-
davit filed with proposed articles of incorporation that 
the requisite capital and surplus had been paid in cash. 
Under cross examination, an officer of the applicant 
testified that the affidavit was in error, that he did not 
want to mislead anybody, that nothing had been paid in, 
and that no stock subscription agreement had been ex-
ecuted by any of the incorporators. (Tr. 76-77) 
It is submitted that the proposed banking institu-
tion has failed to meet the requirements as heretofore 
set forth, and that the Commissioner of Financial In-
stitutions was arbitrary and capricious in finding to the 
contrary. (See Finding of Fact, number 6, R. 6) 
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POINT IV 
THE COl\Il\IISSIONER OF FINANCIAL 
l\fSTITUrrIONS WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS IN ADMITTING 0 BJ E C -
TIONABLE EVIDENCE, AND MAK ING 
FINDINGS THEREFROM, AND IN DISRE-
GARDING EVIDENCE, TO THE PREJU-
DICE OF PLAINTIFF. 
Tu the presentation of its case the Bank of Northern 
Ftah offered certain testimony and exhibits which were 
the suhject of objection; certain of this evidence became 
I he basis for findings and conclusions of the Commis-
sioner of Financial Institutions, which in turn provided 
tlw hasis for the order as issued. The admission of such 
1•1·idPuee was error, and the Commissioner was arbitrary 
and a bused his discretion iu making findings and con-
dusions thereon. 
rr11e findings of an administrative agency must be 
support<•d by substantial evidence; and the rule of sub-
,,ta11tial eviclence is a determinative of lawfulness or 
arbitrary action. In tlH' case of Building Seri·ice Em-
11lo1r1's Lu('al No. 59 c. Ne1cl1011se Realty et al, 97 Utah 
9:J P.2cl 507 this court held: 
" * * * l\Iere uncorroborated hearsay or ru-
mor does not constitute substantial evidence. * * " 
Hearsay and non-expert opinion evidence may not 
he used as a basis to support the findings of the 
Board upon which rests an order sought to be 
enforced. " " " '' 
.11J1crica11 Fo111ulry 111111 Jla('lii11e ('o. r. Ctah Labor 
1!1Tutin11s lfoarrl, (Utah) 141 P.:M 390. 
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In his Finding of Fact 12, the Commissioner cites 
the testimony of Charles J. Cuneo and Charles J. Eddy 
as indicating public convenience and advantage for thP 
proposed bank (R. 8) A careful reading of the testimony 
of applicant's witness, Charles Cuneo, reveals that it is 
replete with hearsay, and clearly objectionable. This is 
especially true with respect to his testimony regarding 
surveys of individuals who have moved into Clearfield, 
and the industries located at the Freeport Center. The 
sun'eys in question >Vere not made by the witness (Tr. 
24); the surveys did not keep a record of those who 
moved from Clearfield (Tr. 25); and the witness was 
unable to testify as to vacated housing. (Tr. 34) The 
witness claimed ten new industries had moved into Free-
port, but could not name them. (Tr. 30) The source of 
the information was hearsay. (Tr. 29) The witness 
opined that there was need for an additional bank, sueh 
judgment being based on the objectionable and defectin 
"evidence" aforementioned. (Tr. 32) Cleary the CYi-
dence elicited from Cuneo was without foundation, rank 
hearsay, and of no probative value. Due objection was 
made to the introduction of such testimony and evidence. 
The testimony of Mr. Charles Eddy reflects a con-
tinuing bias and prejudice against this protestant and 
interjection of his personal politics into the issue before 
the Commissioner. He seems to be motivated also by the 
potential taxes which Clearfield will realize if an addi-
tional bank is authorized in the city. (Tr. 47) The opin-
ions of Charles Eddy indicate a complete lack of knowl-
edge or understanding of the regulatory system of bank-
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ing w the state and country, and an inability to 
il i m{uish a bank from any other business. 
\i ayor Eddy claimed that his opinion was that of the 
city council. (Tr. 44) Certain councilmen have stated 
t0 the contrary, and rightly left the decision with the 
Commissioner, free of political pressure. (Plaintiff pro-
testant 's Exhibit AE) 
In his Finding of Fact 17, the Commissioner adopts 
th<· testimony of William A. Beutler, an officer of the 
rl1·fondant Bank of Northern Utah, regarding the pro-
jede<l deposit growth and earnings and expenses for 
th(' proposed bank. (R. 8) Such a finding was unsup-
ported, for l\Ir. Beutler newr did come up with the evi-
ck·11el' in support of his projections, upon which the 
\ 'ommissioner made the "finding". 
Jkutler referred to a "study" he had made which 
1H· nc•ver produced, supposedly based upon reports pub-
lishe(l in the Polk Directory and published by the State 
Banking Department which he never identified. (Tr. 58) 
Hr did not cite figures (Tr. 60) ; he did not have them 
\1ith him (Tr. 64, 65, 66); he admitted he did not do 
"iml0pendent research to come up to this hearing", but 
"rPlied heaYily on the work we had done for the previous 
l111 ari11g ". (Tr. 80) Actually, he deferred to another ·wit-
lll's:,; (Tr. G5, 82,), who in turn did not analyze the profit-
ability of the proposed institution, and in turn deferred 
t11 Beutler. (Tr. 204) 
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This witlless Beutler produce<l llO evidence of a pro-
bative nature to support the projected growth of the UL-
fendant applicant, despite the queries of protestants, the 
Commissioner, and the attorney for the Commissioner. 
(Tr. 63-65) 
The Commissioner in his Conelusioll 8 states in part: 
" * * * The projections applicant has made 
for its growth may be optimistic, * * " " 
(R. 10) 
yet the Commissioner referred to such testimony in his 
f inclings. 
Finding of Fact 17 is not supported by substantial 
evidence, is erroneous and its adoption by the Commis-
sioner is contrary to law. Timely objection to the "testi-
mony" of Beutler was made. (R. 59) 
The <lefenclant commissioner 'ms also arbitrary and 
capricious in adopting his findings of fact, numbers 9, 
10, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 (R. 7, 8) which infer a demand 
or hasis for authorizing the proposed banking operation. 
It appears that the <lefendant Commissioner followed 
the approach and argument of Milton Matthews, a wit-
ness for the Bank of Northern Utah, 'vho had prepared 
a so-called economic analysis, <lef endant applicant's Ex-
hihit 1. Actually, the role of Mr. l\Iatthews was one of 
an advocate, as his active participation would indicate. 
(Tr. 250) His exhibit and testimony were in the nature of 
argument, being prepared to support a conclusion al-
ready asserted by the defendant bank in its applic-a ti on, 
and prior to the preparation of the study. l\[ilton 
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.\[;, t t li<'ws admitted he was not an expert in the field 
,,; : ,;111 ki11g-, and had never worked in a bank any-
11 lien· in t lw sta tc of l: tah. (Tr. 165, 166) He in no way 
uualyzed the profitability of the proposed institution, or 
its effect on the deposits of the existing institutions. 
('J'r. 204) His presentation was based almost entirely 
011 hParsay material, and not being qualified as an ex-
pert, was incapable of analyzing the significance of the 
material as it bore upon the question of public need of 
a hank, if any. (Tr. 274-275) 
Vi11ding of fact, number 11 (R. 8, 9) and Conclusion 
(i ( H. 10), as promulgated by the defendant Commis-
sioner refor to certain population figures as adopted 
h)· th<' defendant Commissioner, and a ratio of bank-
ing offin•s to population. The Commissioner's action 
is erroneous in that he has adopted the Matthe,.vs 
popnlatio11 estimates which partake of inherent deficien-
"ies . .'.\latthews used Davis County authorized building 
JH rmits as the criteria for estimating population after 
1%0, ,,·ith an arbitrary allocation on a local area basis. 
( St>l' defl•ndant applicant's Exhibit 1) Therefore, his 
population figures did not consider any demolition or 
racancies occurring during the same period. (Tr. 170) 
This is most significant in Clearfield, where there has 
l1<'e11 a reduction of over 235 dwelling units at Anchorage 
llonsi11g since 1960, aml relocation of Clearfield resi-
de11ts (Tr. 327). The attempt by .'.\Iatthews to cover over 
this lld'iciency was unsuccessful, and typical of other 
inaeC'uracies. (Tr. 170) The defendant Commissioner per-
pl'i uatcd this l'ITor throughout his findings. 
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The defendant Commissioner's findings and con. 
clusions relating to the population comparisons require 
the arbitrary allocation of a potential clientele to a trad-
ing area which does not exist in fact, and amounts to an 
economic gerrymander. For example, Finding of fact 
number 11 purports to total and compare population of 
certain cities in North Davis County, and analyzes th(' 
banking facilities therein. The area thus carved out for 
comparison swings south sen'n miles from Clearfield to 
Kaysville (Tr. 285), but dramatcially halts short of the 
Weber County line at the north and fails to include Roy, 
within 3 miles of Clearfield, and Riverdale, within 3 
miles, (Tr. 285) Sec Point VI, infra. In comparing ratio,-
of banking facilities to population of DaYis County, thr· 
Commissioner includes the South Davis areas which are 
far more remote than South ·w cber banking offices and 
population. 
The approach of the defendant Commissioner, and 
defendant applicant, seem to presuppose some owr-
simplified mathematical formula: X number of people= 
a bank. Obviously, this arbitrary method fails to consider 
factors which should be taken into consideration in such 
a determination. The findings of the Commissioner in-
clude the reasoning and premise that somehow the popu-
lation per banking facility determined on a state basis 
is the criteria for determining the necessity or require-
ment of a local bank. This averaging process, of neces-
sity, lumps unit hanks and branch offices, the 
such as those at Richmond, Eureka, and Green River, 
supported by small rural populations, with main bank 
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dtu·e,; at Salt Lake City. Any valid analysis of existing 
1i<1nk i. · g- facilities requires at least a recognition and ap-
prnpria te differentiation of unit and branch banks. 
(Plai11tiff protestant's Exhibit G; Tr. 317) 
Furthermore, the "population approach" of the de-
frndants engages in dangerous circular reasoning for the 
mon• hanking institutions in the state, the lower the 
population per banking facility, which average if applied 
to a g-i,·en area with a higher population per facility, 
'·' ould result in a grant of a new facility; this in turn 
l1>1n•rs the average population per facility in the state 
relp1iring more banks, ad infinitum. The fallacy of this 
ap1Jroach is evident-for, in truth, increasing the bank-
ing- facilities cannot result in the requirement of more 
I 1ai1king facilities. 
It is submitted that the Commissioner's equating 
hauking needs solely with population is arbitrary; how-
1•n:'r if the approach is deemed reasonable it should con-
·'i1k•r adult population and not the general population. 
ln this regard the plaintiff protestant offered an analy-
-;is of banking facilities per population of 18 years and 
oldC'r, which in itself includes ages which do not normally 
g(•11erate hanking demands. Even with such concession, 
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It is evident that Davis County haR more hm:b. fH 
population 18 and over than any of the more populated 
areas in the state. 
It is also apparent that a comparison of the general 
population per unit bank, for the state and the populated 
counties, indicates that Davis County haR a lower popu-
lation (13,571) per unit bank than Weber (26,200), Utah 
(21,166) or Salt Lake Counties (33,000), or the State of 
Utah (19,145). (Plaintiff protcstant's Exhibit AF) 
In adopting his findings the defendant Commis-
sioner also arbitrarily ignored the existence of State 
Sa,·ings and Loan Association, located at Clearfield, 
Utah (Tr. 282, 467), the only savings and loan i1rntitu-
tion in North DaviR County, in his population arnJ ratio 
comparisons. 
It is further submitted that the defendant Commis-
sioner based his findings and conclusions on hearsay and 
other clearly ohjectionable evidence; and that in so doing 
also he was arbitrary and abused his discretion in that 
in accepting such "evidence" he disregarded other com-
petent and convincing evidence. See Building Sercice 
Employees Local No. 59 v. Newhouse Realty Co. et al, 
supra. Thus in accepting certain population informatio11 
of defendant applicant, the defendant Commissioner 
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tot a !,y disregarded the population characteristics and 
geography of the area, which bear directly on 
the issue of probable support of the proposed existing 
institution. See Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Tlie record clearly indicates that Clearfield, Utah, is 
limited i11 its population potential and economic develop-
me11t hy reason of its present geographical and political 
houmlaries. (Tr. 278-289; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits 
B, l'.) The city is "hemmed in" by Hill Field on the 
1·nst; Layton City on the south; Syracuse on the west; 
aml Sunset City on the north. Clearfield is internally 
dissected by the Interstate Freeway 15; the trackage of 
t\rn major railroads; the Freeport Center; and public 
within its boundaries. All of these factors have 
ri:strided the growth of Clearfield, and left only a limit-
1•d amount of acreage for residential construction, which 
arnilahle acreage is of questionable desirability (Tr. 
nR-289, 388; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits B, C.) 
TIH'se limitations and restrictions have resulted in a sub-
sta11tial decline in residential construction and other de-
n'lopment in Clearfield during the most recent years in 
<·ontrast to surrounding areas, such as Layton and Kays-
\·ille (Tr. 383; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibit W.) It 
woultl seem that if any real growth were going to occur 
it "hould have been in the most recent years--but no such 
iuerease has take11 placP in Cl0arficl<l. 
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The defendant Commissioner also ignored the low 
median age of the Davis County population in 
with surrounding counties in the state. The percentages 
of the population under 18 years of age for the most 
populated counties and the state are as follows: Davis 
County 47.5; W cber County 37.2; Salt Lake County 38.7; 
Utah County 37.9; State of Utah :-!9.3. (Plaintiff pro-
testant's Exhibit X) It is apparent that the population 
of Davis County and Clearfield indicate a higher percent-
age of infants, and a lower demand for bauking 
than the population of other areas comprised of a higher 
percentage of adults and their resulting needs arising 
from commercial transactions. 
Also ignored was the uncontroverted e\·idence that 
the Clearfield population is hea,·ily dependant upon 
federal government employment, especially Hill Air 
Force Base. Approximately 70 per cent of the employed 
persons in Clearfield arc employed by the federal go\·-
ernment (Tr. 309) which employment lends itself to a 
more transcient population. Being so heavily dependent 
upon Hill Air Force Base, the economy of Clearfield 
suffers, and has suffered, severe adverse consequences 
with cutbacks at the military installation, and real and 
potential reductions are continuing problems because of 
political decisions, peace negotiations, congressional ap-
propriations, and changes in the military posture. The 
decreases aud potential cutback in this employment wNr 
predicted by Frank M. Browning, 01w of the principab 
im·olnd in the application, in testimony before the Com-
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rn au earlier hearing. (See plaintiff Protest-
·1H! 's ; 0 \:hibit A) 
Tli0 defendant Commissioner also disregarded the 
"om·incing e'.'idence that the trading patterns of the 
l'learfiPld population indicate an orientation toward 
Ogdr11 as a major point for the purchase of goods. (Tr. 
:3G8, :377, 395), borne out by per capita sales and services 
fa\. rnllection companions (Plaintiff Protestant's Ex-
hibits?\, 0, P), and development of areas outside Clear-
fiPkl. ('l'r. 445, 449) 
The adual demands of Davis County residents for 
in the immediate areas are for less than other 
commnnities of the state, as indicated by the per capita 
l1a11k rPsources, deposits allCl loans in Davis County as 
c·ompan•cl to the state as a whole, revealing Davis County 
i;-; far helow the state aYerage, and its rate of increase 
11ot eommensura te with the population increase. (Plain-
t if±" Protestant's Exhibit U) 
It is submitted that the defendant Commissioner 
11·as arbitrary and capricious, and abused his discretion, 
in rlisrPg"a rding the aforementioned evidence, and ac-
('l']Jting- only part of the eYidence presented, and that of 
11m•stionable competency. It is also submitted that the 
finding-:-; and c0Hclusio11s adopted by the Commissioner 
an• not true findings and conclusions, not only as to 
I orm, hut also 110t hased on substantial evidence. 
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POINT V 
THE PROPOSED LOCATION OF 
FENDANT APPLICANT AND Irrs FIF}LD 
OF OPERATION ARE IN SUCH CLOSE 
PROXIMITY TO THE C L E A RF I E L D 
STATE BANK AS TO UNREASONABLY IN-
TERFERE WirrH SAID BANK, AND 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT APPLICANT 
AND PLAINTIFF SUCH AS TO 1\fAKE IM-
PROBABLE THEIR SUCCESS. 
Tlw statutory pro,·isions of Seetion 7-1-26 U.C.A. 
1953, as amende(l, make as a con<litio11 for denial of an 
application. 
" * * * \\·hen the location or fi0ld of op0ratio11 
of the proposed business shall lw in such close 
proximity to an established business subject to 
this title that such established business might be 
unreasonably interferred with and the support 
of the new business would he such as to make irn-
proba hle its success" " " ". 
It is contended that the eYidence submitted in the 
administrative hearing indicates the foregoing statutory 
condition to exist. The application in que;;tion is unlike 
the situation where an applicant seeks to estahfo;]i a 
hanking site more co11\'enient to a local area; th0 defcu-
dant applicant in effect offers no new advantage of 
greater convenience, hut duplicates facilities to cfo·ide 
the present business. In his conclusion G, the Commis-
sioner conclwles that the "field of opNation of the pro-
posed bank will not be in such close' proximity to all 
Pxisting husint>ss as to mircasm1ahly i11tPrcforp with it.'' 
(R. Howcwr, i11 his Fimling of Fad, numlwr 10, the 
Commissioner states: 
28 
" * * * Clearfirld State Bank depends upon 
t lic- trading area that would be served by the 
applicant for its primary source of business; 
* * * " (R. 7) 
Adually the trading area of defendant applicant is 
literally identical with that of the plaintiff. Also, the 
Hidence rPvrals that the defrndant applicant has not 
dPtcrmine<l anything sprcifically respecting its proposed 
hank site (Tr. 78) and that no lease agreement had been 
<•x(•rutPcl (Tr. 150) It is therefore submitted that the 
d<·fendant Commissioner had no substantial basis to 
n•1wli the conclusion aforementioned. 
F11rtl1Nmore, the order of the defendant Commis-
siom•r sets forth no specific location for the proposed 
l 1a11ki ng operation. Irnleed, the order is a cart a blanche 
<Is far as the' location in C'learfirld is concerned, pro-
\ idi11g: 
"That the application of Bank of Northern 
a proposed Utah corporation, for permis-
sion to establish a unit hank in Clearfield, Davis 
County, Utah, is hereby approved, subject to the 
condition that it qualify for and obtain insurance 
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
lwforp it commences operation" (R. 10) 
The actual site of any proposed bank is a critical 
l'i<'Ill('llt in <1Ptermini11g the question of the location and 
t'ic>ld of opc•ration of said hank and any unreasonable in-
h·rfrrenc·e with an existing institution. How can the ad-
mi11istrntin• officL'l' make such a determination "·hen the 
'itc• is uncertain! Aml how can thr existing institution 
IH· protc•d<>d against m1n•aso11alilr interference unless 
<111 (1pc•rntion is restrictr<l to a sprcific site? It is sub-
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mitted that the defendant Commissioner's action in this 
respect is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of dis-
cretion. 
The success of plaintiff is further in jeopardy for 
the reason that an authorized branch of the First Nation-
al Bank of Layton, at Syracuse Road on the Clearfield 
border, will divert customers of the Clearfield State 
Bank, since that branch is located nearer to one-third 
of the Clearfield population than the office of plaintiff. 
(Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibits B, C.) There is alread1 
in existence the branch of the First Security Bank of 
Utah N.A., at Hill Field, subjecting the plaintiff to 
direct interference. (Tr. 280) The Commissioner gaw 
no indication that he weighed the effect of two additional 
banking institutions on the plaintiff. 
Another area of unreasonable interef erence IS the 
restriction that will result on the growth of the Clear-
field State Bank and the denial to that institution of the 
acquisition of electronic devices and computers, presently 
used in the industry by larger institutions. (Tr. 312-31B) 
A small independent bank, such as the Clearfield State 
Bank, cannot at present afford to acquire sophisticated 
electronic hanking devices, and necessary technical per-
sonnel; if the growth of plaintiff is delayed or halted, thr 
bank will not be able to secure the cleviees and render thl' 
service which attends their use, and will be adversely 
affected by the competition from those banking institu-
tions ·which have this electronic banking mechanisms 
(Tr. 312-313.) No where is there indication that the Com-
missioner regarded this evidence in his decision. 
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POINT VI 
DEFENDANT APPLICANT HAS NOT 
PRG\,TED A DEMAND FOR THE PROPOS-
1;;D SERVICES. 
It is submitted that Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, requires inter alia, as a condition for granting 
an application to operate a bank, that the applicant prove 
a public demand for the proposed services, and that this 
sho\Ying he tantamount to proving public convenience 
and advantage. 
No substantial evidence indicates a demand or need 
for the proposed service; nor was any evidence produced 
claiming the needs of the Clearfield residents are other-
\rise tha11 adequately and fully served by existing banks 
and institutions. 
Hereinafter set forth are the locations of banks and 
loan institutions, all competitive, and the mileages of 
the Rame from the business center of Clearfield: 
Clearfield 
Clearfield State Bank 
State Savings and Loan Association 
2 Mile Radius 
Branch, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 
Hill Field 
Authorized Branch, First National Bank of 
Layton, (Syracuse Road) on Clearfield, 
Layton boundary 
Branch, Clearfield State Bank, Sunset 
:n 
2-3 Mile Radius 
Branch, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Roy 
Branch, Bank of Utah, Roy 
3-5 Mile Radius 
Branch, First National Bank of Layton, Layton 
(Fort Lane Shopping Center) 
First National Bank of Layton, Layton 
North Davis Bank, Layton 
Branch, Bank of Utah, Riverdale 
5-6 :Mile Radius 
Branch, Commercial Security Bank, "\Vashington 
Terrace 
6-7 Mile Radius 
Branch, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., South 
Ogden 
Branch, Commercial Security Bank, South Ogden 
Branch, Bank of Utah, South Ogden 
Barnes Banking Company, Kaysville 
(Tr. 278-283; Plaintiff Protestant's Exhibit C) 
Of the aforementioned hanking facilities, three arP 
owned by the principals here involved, which facilitie,; 
can be reached by Clearfield residents within a fe11 
minutes time. Also existent in the• area arc other foian-
cial institutions, including thr especially compctitivl' 
Federal Employees Credit U 11ion (Tr. 300-:30:1), serYing 
employees of the federal government and their families. 
There is indication that the drfcnclant Commii,;sioncr dis-
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reg-;11'<lr·d the existence of certain of the foregoing in-
,-t/utioli'. by reason of his arbitrary analysis of the in-
-;titutions in relation to population, and in failing to 
Jetf'rmine the competitive effect of the foregoing insti-
tutions, and the consequences of the proposed institution 
doing business at Clearfield; and the fact that the bank-
ing requirements of the Clearfield residents are being 
full)' and adequately met. 
CONCLUSION 
Bv reason of the foregoing, the decision of the lower 
('ourt should be reversed, and a judgment entered or 
direck<l, granting plaintiff the relief sought for in its 
complaint, including the setting aside of the Order of 
tlH' Commissioner of Financial Institutions which has 
authorized the banking operation at issue by defendant 
Bank of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYl\IOND W. GEE 
-100 ExecutiYe Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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